Most empirical analyses of felon disenfranchisement and other voting rights laws focus on the implications of the laws on potential voters and political outcomes as if they are fully implemented. However, the administrative structure used by states to implement these laws varies as well as the extent that the implementation is monitored and the competitiveness of the electoral environment. We formally model the process by which states choose voting rights measures such as felon disenfranchisement laws. We …nd that di¤erent administrative and monitoring structures as well as competitiveness of the electoral environment are likely to a¤ect both the adoption and implementation of the laws. Even states with identical laws but di¤erent administrative and/or monitoring systems and di¤erent levels of electoral competition are predicted to have di¤erent degrees of implementation. We argue that empirical research that ignores these interactive e¤ects may inaccurately estimate the e¤ects of the laws on potential voters and political outcomes.
Introduction
The United States constitution delegates the determination of eligibility to vote to the states as long as the right is not denied by race, ethnicity, or gender. 1 Recently activists and scholars have focused on two restrictions to voting that exist in almost all states-restrictions on the voting rights of those who have been either incarcerated or convicted of crimes (felon disenfranchisement laws) 2 
and noncitizens. Organizations such as The Immigrant Voting
Project at the World Policy Institute at the New School and the Sentencing Project have made advocacy of voting rights for noncitizens and o¤enders, respectively, a principal goal.
Scholars have concentrated on estimating the impact of the laws (especially felon disenfranchisement) for individuals [Western (2002) and ( McDonald and Popkin (2001) contend that these laws are a principal explanation for the perception that turnout has been declining in recent American elections. They argue that because most studies rely on census estimates of the voting age population, scholars have failed to account for the percentage of voters who were disenfranchised which has risen over time. Manza and Uggen (2002, 2006 ) also estimate turnout rates in United States elections 1 Also in federal elections, states cannot restrict voting by age for those older than seventeen. 2 Sometimes these laws apply to those convicted of misdemeanors as discussed below.
and simulate elections with felons allowed to vote. They argue that in some senate races and presidential elections the outcomes would have been reversed if voting rights were restored.
Hayduk (2006) examines case studies of e¤orts to expand the franchise to noncitizens in local elections and maintains that such expansions are necessary for the achievement of e¤ective representation of minority groups in American politics. In an important new contribution to understanding polarization in American politics, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) assert that the increase in the percentage of nonvoters due to immigration has kept the median voter's income from falling even as inequality has risen in the United States. They argue that this has limited demand for redistributive governmental policies to lessen that inequality and perhaps also has helped facilitiate the increasing polarization of American political parties.
The literature generally assumes that the laws are implemented as written. But activists note that often these laws are administered by o¢ cials with considerable discretion and authority. One of the criticisms of voter ID laws used to make sure that voting restrictions are enforced (such as those recently passed in Arizona and Georgia and in use in eighteen other states) is that the laws will be discriminatorily enforced. Even in places that do not require voters to show ID, poll workers are known to ask certain voters to prove their identity, in many cases demanding ID from minority voters but not whites."
The concern about how election o¢ cials might use discretion in the implementation of voting rights'restrictions is not a new one. In the 19th and early 20th century a number of states enacted literacy tests which gave broad discretion to registrars who were required to judge whether or not a given applicant's reading skills warranted enrollment as a voter.
Originally such tests were used to screen out immigrant voters in northern states, like Massachusetts and Connecticut. After the end of Reconstruction, southern states began to adopt literacy tests and increasingly relied on their discriminatory application to keep AfricanAmericans from voting while allowing the pariticipation of illiterate whites. One delegate at Virginia's Constitutional Convention declared "Discrimination! Why that is precisely what we propose." 5 The obvious discriminatory administration of literacy tests led to their discontinuation with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
It remains to be seen whether the administration of new voter ID and proof of citizenship requirements will lead to similar discriminatory applications. What we can say with certainty is that how much authority is delegated, how much discretion is o¤ered, and the degree to which o¢ cials are monitored can matter in terms of who participates in elections. is a subject that has not been addressed in the formal literature to our knowledge.
In this paper we provide a simple model of the process of determining voting rights that incorporates administrative structure and monitoring. Our model is organized around the real world case of felon disenfranchisement laws which exist in 48 states and the District of Columbia. These laws vary across the states both in terms of whether the franchise is restricted for o¤enders who have completed their sentences versus only those incarcerated and the types of convictions that lead to disenfranchisement. We argue that this variation, which is confusing to both voters and election o¢ cials, allows for considerable discretion in the administration of the laws. Evidence suggests that election o¢ cials sometimes enfranchise those who have been legally disenfranchised or disenfranchise those who are legally eligible to vote. Thus, these laws provide a useful lens for modeling the strategic decisionmaking involved in the administration of voting rights and monitoring that administration.
In the next section we review felon disenfranchisement laws and state administration of voting processes. In Section III we present our formal model of the determination of voting rights laws which formally incorporates how administrative structure and monitoring decisions a¤ect the laws and their implementation. Section IV discusses the implications of these predictions for understanding felon disenfranchisement laws and other voting rights restrictions.
Felon Disenfranchisement Laws

Who Loses the Right to Vote
Before examining the administration of felon disenfranchisement laws, we consider the sizeable variation in these laws across the United States and the existing literature on these laws and their e¤ects. As of April 2006, we divide states into …ve types (excluding laws pertaining to voting related convictions which in many states lead to permanent disenfranchisement regardless of the laws with respect to other criminal convictions). 9 The city Election Commission Executive Director Susan Edman remarked on …nding this out: "I expect that should have raised a red ‡ag. That shouldn't have been accepted, really." Gina Barton, "A Felon But Not a Fraud," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, March 17, 2006. for reviews]. Our emphasis is on how the disenfranchisement is accomplished. We believe that the issue of how disenfranchisement occurs is important for understanding the other questions addressed in the literature, which we return to in Section IV. We now turn to our discussion of the administration of these disenfranchisement laws. The federal legislation might lead one to conclude that there is little variation across states in voter registration procedures. Certainly this is the intent of many of the proponents of the legislation and other reform proposals. However, we argue that even with these measures which have standardized much of the process across the states, states do vary signi…cantly in how registration decisions are handled, in particular, how much of that decision process is administered by local elected o¢ cials.
Local Election O¢ cials and Voter Registration
All states have local o¢ cials who handle voter registrations, or in North Dakota where voter registration is optional, the process of determining who can vote on election day [Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming allow voters to register at the polls]. Even voter registrations that are mailed in or completed at state o¢ ces as required by the Motor Voter Act are forwarded to the local election o¢ cial in charge of the jurisdiction where the voter reports to reside. Thus, it would appear that all states essentially delegate voter registration decisions to these o¢ cials. However, the degree to which these o¢ cials are independent of state control (that is locally elected or appointed by locally elected o¢ cials) diverges signi…cantly across states.
The extent of decentralization of power is a function of two variables-the process by which local election o¢ cials are selected and whether the state provides an explicit monitoring role for political parties. We expect that when local election o¢ cials are selected locally these o¢ cials will have more discretionary power. Conversely, if a state provides for bipartisanship monitoring, then we expect that the two major parties in their competition for o¢ ce will reduce their discretionary ability. In other states the registration process is more centralized and under the control of state o¢ cials. In twelve states, the governor or the state o¢ cial or board in charge of elections directly appoints or is signi…cantly involved in the appointment of local voter registration o¢ cials, who are typically comprised of a local election board. In Ohio the political parties appoint members to the local election boards, who work with the Secretary of State. In 10 Gregory Roberts, "Voter Database Should Fix Problems But New State System Won't Solve All Registration Flaws," The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 29, 2005 11 The state later announced that the list did not include potential felons who had self identi…ed as Hispanics and thus would have allowed some to vote illegally if the list had been used as the source for disenfranchisement. Apparently the glitch had existed since at least 1998 and had been known to state election o¢ cials.
Virginia the justices of the circuit courts appoint the local election o¢ cials and in the District of Columbia the election o¢ cials are appointed by the mayor.
In the majority of states, 33, if a political party is not represented among the elected o¢ cials involved in voter registration or in appointing those o¢ cials, then the political party has no legal in ‡uence over that process. But in seventeen states and the District of Columbia both major political parties, regardless of their representation among elected o¢ cials, have some in ‡uence usually through a bipartisan board at the state level or through requirements that local election boards have representation from the two major political parties. As noted above, we contend that when the process is bipartisan, local election o¢ cials have less discretion in making disenfranchisement decisions. But even bipartisan controls may not translate into a straightforward monitoring process. Although some states come close to a balance that is equal, for example, in Delaware both the local and state boards are required to be perfectly balanced by party, ultimately the members are appointed by elected o¢ cials (the governor in Delaware). Moreover, the other states with bipartisanship requirements explicitly give the party that either holds the governorship or a majority in the state legislature (or the local county government) more positions, giving one party an advantage. Table   1 summarizes the administration of voter registration. States local election o¢ cials as to the extent that these o¢ cials are partisan or nonpartisan. 12 In a six state study of paper ballot designs they discerned signi…cant evidence that Democratic election administrators tended to produce better designed ballots than Republican administrators, but that the best designed ballots in their sample were produced by nonpartisan or bipartisan administrators. However, because there were few such admin- it is not explained by these same factors, suggesting that in the heat of a competitive election, these factors were mitigated.
The results from these studies of the e¤ects of election administration on ballot design and provisional voting suggest that administrators do attempt to make decisions that a¤ect electoral outcomes, although their in ‡uence on these outcomes varies with the level of the administrator and the extent that their choices are made in a competitive environment where they are likely to be observed and monitored by other concerned actors.
Summary
Our review of felon disenfranchisement laws and voter registration procedures can be summarized in the following general conclusions:
Felon disenfranchisement laws vary widely across the states and with respect to the type of conviction which often means that the interpretations that local election o¢ cials give to these laws can be consequential in deciding who participates on election day.
States vary in how much power they give to locally elected o¢ cials in the administration of voter registration (thus the determination of who participates on election day) as well as the extent that they require bipartisan involvement in the process and thus monitoring by those who are currently not in political power. However, empirical studies suggest that the discretionary decisions of election o¢ cials are less consequential when election contests are close.
We now turn to our model of how these delegation decisions are made and their implications for the extent of disenfranchisement. We …rst model the administration of voting when the registrar of voting is a state o¢ cial.
In our model we assume two actors: a Legislature, L, and a Registrar, R. We assume that the question facing the legislature and the registrar is to what extent to allow a group of well de…ned potential voters to participate in a future election. We can think of this group of individuals as convicted felons or as noncitizens who have established residency or as illiterate voters. We assume that the status quo is that these individuals are not currently allowed to vote.
We consider a four stage game. In the …rst stage, L 0 , the legislature in term 0, chooses a law designating how many of these nonvoters to prevent from voting, which we de…ne as m L . In the second stage, R determines how to implement the law, which we de…ne as m R .
We (1)
where m is the law that is actually enforced and is a weighted average of m R and m L , is the weight placed on m R and is a constant such that 0 < 1; and " is a random For example, a noncompetitive electoral environment would characterize the situation in some southern states that used literacy tests during the …rst half of the twentieth century.
Regardless of whether or not all of the population that could be potentially disenfranchised through the administration of the literacy test had the right to vote, Democrats would have retained control of state governments. Table 2 describes our assumptions about the relationship between , monitoring, and competitiveness: 
Thus, if the environoment is noncompetitive and the legislature does not monitor, then the weight placed on m L is zero and the weight placed on m R is one. We assume that if the legislature chooses to monitor the registrar or the electoral environment is competitive, the actual implemented law is a weighted average of the registrar's attempted implementation and the legislature's law. This re ‡ects the fact that even when an outcome of an election is shown to be partly the consequence of fraud or illegal disenfranchisement, typically the …nal outcome is biased toward the initial judgement of the outcome. Hence, even when caught the registrar's attempted implementation in ‡uences the …nal election outcome. Furthermore, we assume that both monitoring and competitiveness increase the weight placed on m L .
In the fourth stage, L 1 enacts policy on x equal to x 1 .
Issues in Interpretation
We discuss the legislature's decision as a monitoring one rather than a decision on how much discretion to grant because it better captures the case of disenfranchisement. That is, although a few states'disenfranchisement laws are vague and give some explicit discretion to registrars (as in Alabama's lack of a de…nition of which crimes are classi…ed as those of moral turpitude for example), most do have explicit rules governing who is disenfranchised. The discretion occurs through a lack of enforcement by the legislature (a lack of monitoring) and the confusing nature of the laws across states that results in missinformation rather than an explicit decision of the legislature to grant the registrar the power to determine who can vote from the population a¤ected by the law. Even in Alabama, those a¤ected by the law have sought a precise characterization of which crimes are classi…ed as those of moral turpitude in the courts. Therefore, we assume that state legislatures are forced to write a precise law, but then choose how much to monitor the law's implementation by the registrars.
How do we interpret "? We can think of higher values of x 1 as representing more conservative policies. Then in order to achieve a given level of conservatism, the number of voters who need to be disenfranchised depends on the value of the random factor. If " > 0, fewer voters need to be disenfranchised than the law requires to achieve a given level of conservatism and if " < 0, more voters need to be disenfranchised than the law requires to achieve the same level of conservatism. We assume that the realization of " is known by R but not L 0 . We can think of the random variable as capturing characteristics of voters that in ‡uence policy preferences but on which L 0 cannot legally discriminate by restricting voting rights or cannot observe but R can observe. Race, ethnicity, gender, education, income, are all factors that may be discernible by the registrar and meet these assumptions. Note that we are assuming that most of the potential voters are liberal. The model could be formulated assuming the opposite with symmetric conclusions.
The model can be alternatively interpreted where x 1 is not a measure of public policy, but who can vote. That is, we could interpret x 1 as a measure of the percentage of individuals of a particular type in the group of potential voters, for example, African-Americans or
Latinos, that will be prevented from participating in the upcoming election. Under such an assumption, then, equation (1) is the relationship between the legislature's disenfranchisement law, the registrar's implementation of the law, and a random shock in determining the percentage of individuals of that particular type who are disenfranchised. In such a formulation, since we allow x 1 to vary from a to 1 + a, if all the individuals of this type are enfranchised, then x 1 = a and if all the individuals of this type are disenfranchised, then
The assumption is that increases disenfranchisement of these potential voters increases disenfranchisement of the percentage of individuals of this particular type.
Bendor and Meirowitz (2006) make the point that the typical random error term in delegation models is less important than has been previously thought, thus including such a term may be seen as complicating the model unnecessarily. In our model the random error term is necessary precisely because the legislature cannot disenfranchise voters directly by policy preferences or race or ethnicity. If we omitted the random error term then we would be assuming that the legislature could disenfranchise individuals based on their policy preferences or their race or ethnicity.
Utility Functions
We assume that the legislature in term 0 is forward looking and cares only about policy, not who can vote. That is, L 0 's utility is in terms of future policy to be enacted by the future legislature as follows:
and c is the marginal cost of monitoring the registrar, we assume c > 0 if the legislature monitors. We assume that the legislature chooses whether or not to monitor the registrar and that if the legislature chooses to monitor the registrar, the legislature detects fully the registrar's implementation of the law. If the legislature chooses not to monitor, then c = 0.
As we noted above, we could alternatively interpret x 1 as a measure of the percentage of voters of a particular type, for example, a particular race or ethnicity of voters, that will be prevented from participating in the upcoming election. In such an interpretation then, if the legislature prefers that all of these individuals are enfranchised, then b x L0 = a and if the legislature prefers that all of these individuals are disenfranchised, then b x L0 = 1 + a:
What does it mean for the legislature to monitor the registrar? We can think of the monitoring as setting up a process in which individuals are involved that represent the full distribution of preferences over x in the population in the state, not just the voting population in the election as decided by the registrars, as for example in a bipartisan election board.
The assumption is that through such procedures, errant registrars are caught and forced to pay for their missdeeds.
We assume that the registrar also cares about policy enacted by future legislatures just like L 0 . Formally, the utility function for the registrar is given by:
where b x R is the policy ideal point of R and f is the fee paid by registrar of for each deviation from the legislature's disenfranchisement law when the legislature chooses to monitor or the electoral environment is competitive. We assume that f > 0 if either of these conditions hold, 0 otherwise. We assume that if the legislature chooses to monitor or the electoral environment is competitive, the registrar's implementation of the law is detected perfectly.
This fee could be a loss in pay or demotion in job or possibly conviction of a crime. We assume that the more the registrar deviates from the legislature's law when the legislature chooses to monitor or the electoral environment is competitive, the greater the total of fees she expects to pay.
Similar to our discussion of the legislature's preferences, an alternative view of the registrar's utility is that she has preferences over who can vote, not policy. If we think of x 1 as measuring the extent a particular racial or ethnic group is disenfranchised, then a registrar who prefers that all of these individuals be allowed to participate would have b x R = a, and a registrar who prefers that all of these individuals be disenfranchised would have b x R = 1+a:
Equilibrium Predictions
Policy Outcomes In our game, we assume that all the variables and the game structure are known to both actors with the exception of the value of the realized ", which is only known to R (although the legislature knows the distributional assumptions about "). We de…ne an equilibrium to the game as the case where each actor is maximizing his or her expected utility given the other actors'choices and the structure of the game (thus we use a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept). Since the game takes place sequentially, we …rst solve for the optimal strategy of the registrar given m L and the other parameters and then solve for the optimal strategy of the legislature given the anticipated equilibrium strategy of the registrar.
The equilibrium choices of the legislature and the registrar are a function then of their ideal points, the monitoring decision of the legislature, and the electoral environment. We summarize the conclusions about policy outcomes under the di¤erent situations in Proposition 1 below (all proofs are contained in the appendix):
Proposition 1 If there is a single registrar and the legislature and registrar have di¤erent ideal points over policy, that is, b x R 6 = b x L ;then we can draw the following conclusions about the expected and observed policy outcomes:
1. The expected policy outcome, E (x 1 ) ; is closest to the ideal point of the registrar when there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive and is closest to the ideal point of the legislature when there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is competitive.
2. If there is monitoring, in a competitive electoral environment E (x 1 ) is closer to the ideal point of the legislature than in a noncompetitive electoral environment.
3. If the electoral environment is noncompetitive, when the legislature monitors E (x 1 ) is closer to the ideal point of the legislature than when the legislature does not monitor. 4 . If the electoral environment is competitive, when the legislature monitors E (x 1 ) is closer to the ideal point of the registrar than when the legislature does not monitor.
5. If the legislature does not monitor and the electoral environment is noncompetitive the observed policy outcome is equal to the expected policy outcome. If the legislature monitors and/or the electoral environment is competitive then the observed policy is equal to E(
The …rst and second results of Proposition 1 are somewhat counterintuitive. That is, we …nd that the legislature is more likely to have a policy outcome (or percentage of individuals of a particular racial or ethnic group voting) close to its ideal point when the environment is competitive than when it is not competitive, given the two ideal points and the extent of monitoring. The legislature bene…ts from competition. Why is this the case? If the electoral environment is not competitive, then the expectation is that the policy that results from the implemented law is equivalent to the registrar's ideal point and the legislature has no in ‡uence over policy since there is no reason for the registrar to choose any di¤erently.
However, if the electoral environment is competitive, then the registrar has a potential of being caught and must pay a price that is proportional to how far she deviates from the legislature's law. Thus, the legislature is able to choose a law which yields an expected policy outcome that is equal its own ideal point because the registrar, through paying the fee for errant behavior, is forced to respond to the law the legislature enacts. Competitiveness of the electoral environment means that the legislature has more in ‡uence over administration of the law and thus policy. If the legislature monitors, we …nd a similar relationship. That is, when the legislature monitors the expected policy outcome will be a weighted average of the registrar's and legislature's ideal points as described in Table A1 in the appendix. The weight on the legislature's ideal point is higher when the electoral environment is competitive than when it is not competitive (the weight on the legislature's ideal point is a decreasing function of and since competition decreases , it increases the weight on the legislature's ideal point, even when the legislature is monitoring).
Moreover Since there are clear bene…ts to monitoring when the electoral environment is noncompetitive, should the legislature always choose to monitor in a noncompetitive environment?
Not necessarily because monitoring does increase the variance in the observed policy outcome. When the electoral environment is noncompetitive, although the expected policy outcome is closer to the legislature's ideal point, because the legislature does not know the size of the random shock, it might be optimal for the legislature not to monitor since if the shock is large, the registrar's choice, which is a certainty, may be closer to the ideal point of the legislature than the outcome with monitoring. That is, if the registrar and the legislature have preferences over x that are similar, the legislature would prefer to delegate to the registrar, not monitor, even though this means that the policy outcome will be closer to the registrar's ideal point than the legislature's. The decision, then, on whether the legis-lature should monitor depends on which choice gives the legislature higher expected utility given that the electoral environment is noncompetitive. Intuitively, we expect that when the electoral environment is noncompetitive, the legislature is more likely to monitor if the registrar's ideal point is far from the legislature's ideal point and less likely to monitor if the registrar's ideal point is close to the legislature's ideal point. Proposition 2 summarizes the conditions under which the legislature will choose to monitor (the proof is the appendix):
Proposition 2 When there is a single registrar and the electoral environment is competitive, the legislature will not monitor. When there is a single registrar and the electoral environment is not competitive, the legislature chooses whether or not to monitor as follows:
Registration of Voting at the Local Level 3.2.1 Assumptions
The previous analysis investigated the determinants of the optimal disenfranchisement laws, registrar implementation strategies, and monitoring decisions of the legislature when voter registration is handled at the state level. What happens when voter registration is controlled by locally elected o¢ cials or o¢ cials who are appointed by locally elected o¢ cials? In other words, what happens when voter registration is delegated to o¢ cials who are selected by the district population either directly or indirectly? For ease of exposition we consider the case where there a state is divided into two districts, one urban and one suburban, and each district has it own registrar. Now policy is a function of the implementation of the law in both districts as follows:
1 is the policy outcome in district i; u denotes the urban district and s the suburban one; is determined as above; is the share of the state that is controlled by the urban registrar such that 0 < < 1; and " i is a random variable with a uniform distribution
We assume that the utility functions of the legislature and the two registrars are given by: 
When Registrars Care Only About their District Outcomes
We begin our analysis by assuming that registrars care only about their local district policy outcomes, that is, u = s = 1. When there are two registrars and the registrars care only about local policy, then the situation is similar to the case where there is a single registrar, but with an ideal point equal to the weighted average of the registrars' ideal
; which we de…ne as x R . If x R 6 = b x L ;then we can draw the following conclusions about policy outcomes as summarized in Proposition 3, which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 3
In the two registrar case, if u = s = 1 and x R 6 = b x L ;then we …nd the following relationships:
1. The expected policy outcome, E (x 1 ) ; is closest to the weighted average of the registrars' ideal points when there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive and is closest to the ideal point of the legislature when there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is competitive.
3. If the electoral environment is noncompetitive, when the legislature monitors E (x 1 ) is closer to the ideal point of the legislature than when the legislature does not monitor.
4. If the electoral environment is competitive, when the legislature monitors E (x 1 ) is closer to the weighted average of the registrars'ideal points than when the legislature does not monitor.
5. If the legislature does not monitor and the electoral environment is noncompetitive there is observed policy outcome is equal to the expected policy outcome. If the legislature monitors and/or the electoral environment is noncompetitive then the observed policy is equal to E(
The intuition behind the conclusions of Proposition 3 is the same as with Proposition 1 above. As in the case with a single registrar, the legislature gains nothing from monitoring when the electoral environment is competitive since the expected policy outcome is closer to the legislature's ideal point without monitoring and the size of the random e¤ect is lower without monitoring. When the electoral environment is noncompetitive, the decision whether to monitor depends on whether the weighted average of ideal points of the registrars is extreme relative to the legislature's ideal point as with a single registrar. Proposition 4 summarizes the conditions under which the legislature will choose to monitor:
Proposition 4 When there are two registrars who care only about local policy and the electoral environment is competitive, the legislature will never choose to monitor. When there are two registrars who care only about local policy and the electoral environment is not competitive, the legislature chooses whether or not to monitor as follows: ; and x R 6 = b x L ;then we can draw the following conclusions:
1. When there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive an interior solution may not always exist. An interior solution will exist when the following two conditions hold:
When condition 1 above holds, the expected policy outcome, E (x 1 ) ; is closest to the weighted average of the registrars' ideal points when there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive and is closest to the ideal point of the legislature when there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is competitive.
3. If there is monitoring, in a competitive electoral environment E (x 1 ) is closer to the ideal point of the legislature than in a noncompetitive electoral environment.
4. When condition 1 above holds, if the electoral environment is noncompetitive, when the legislature monitors E (x 1 ) is closer to the ideal point of the legislature than when the legislature does not monitor.
5.
If the electoral environment is competitive, when the legislature monitors E (x 1 ) is closer to the weighted average of the registrars' ideal points (weighted by both the size of the district and the value the registrars place on state policy) than when the legislature does not monitor.
6. If the legislature does not monitor and the electoral environment is noncompetitive there is observed policy outcome is equal to the expected policy outcome. If the legislature monitors and/or the electoral environment is noncompetitive then the observed policy
In the case where registrars care about both state and local policy, we …nd some of the same comparative results discussed above in Propositions 1 and 3. The intutition behind these conclusions is the same as above. However, we also …nd that when registrars are Finally, because interior equilibria may not always exist when registrars care about state policy we cannot state universal conditions for the monitoring decision of the state legislature.
Implications and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a formal model of the decisions facing state legislatures in determining voter rights with a particular application to felon disenfranchisement laws.
Our theoretical results have …ve important implications for understanding the e¤ects of felon disenfranchisement laws as well as other measures that a¤ect who can participate in elections.
First, the administration structure, the extent that voter registration is monitored, and the competitiveness of the electoral environment are as important in understanding how these laws a¤ect both individuals who are potentially disenfranchised and the political outcomes such as turnout and policy choices as the laws themselves. Typically, empirical studies of the e¤ects of these laws do not control for the e¤ects of these factors in estimating the consequences of these laws. Our results show that even if states have the same laws, if the states vary in how the laws are administered, the administration is monitored, and the competitiveness of the electoral environment, then the e¤ects of the laws will be di¤erent and that empirical studies should not ignore these relationships.
Second, our results suggest that counterfactual estimates of the e¤ects of changing these laws are likely inaccurate when they fail to account for the fact that the legislature makes the choices simultaneously with other choices and the endogeneity of these choices. That is, the legislature chooses both a law and how much to monitor that the implementation of the law as well as how much to delegate decision making to local elected o¢ cials. The legislature makes the choices on these dimensions that maximize its utility. The counterfactual thought experiment in which the legislature is forced to have a more expansive law on voting fails to account for the fact that such a legislature might choose a di¤erent monitoring or administrative structure. The implication is that anticipated e¤ects of changes in voting rights may have much less of an impact than estimated. This is not a new idea. Certainly, many voting rights activists observed how some states responded to the expansion of voting rights to African-Americans in 1965 by adopting electoral systems that diluted these votes.
As a consequence the Voting Rights Act was extended to some extent by the courts and
Congress to cover such changes. Our analysis suggests that these counterfactual thought experiments need to consider how state legislatures would optimize on other dimensions if forced to choose a more expansive law. When these o¢ cials care about both state and local policy, there may be wide variation in a state over who can participate in an election.
Appendix: Proofs of Results
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The registrar's optimal choice if there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive is given by:
2 g which does not depend on the legislature's law. It is straightforward to show that the optimal choice for the registrar is to choose m R = b x R " and thus
If there is monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive, we …rst solve for the registrar's optimal choice for a given law:
Which yields:
Now, we can solve for the legislature's optimal law given the registrar's choice by substituting in the registrar's response function:
We can now solve for the equilibrium policy substituting into equation (3) which yields:
The case where the electoral environment is competitive but there is no monitoring, is solved similarly with c = 0: We can summarize the predictions in Table A1 : 
To derive the predictions in Proposition 1, we compare the expected policy outcomes that are derived from Table A1 . First consider the situation where there is no monitoring.
If the electoral environment is not competitive, then the expected policy that results from the implemented law is equivalent to the registrar's ideal point and the legislature has no in ‡uence over the law or policy. However, if the electoral environment is competitive, then the legislature is able to choose a law which yields an expected policy outcome that is expected to equal its own ideal point. Thus, competitiveness of the electoral environment means that the legislature has more in ‡uence over the expected policy when the legislature does not monitor. If the legislature monitors, we …nd a similar relationship. That is, when the legislature monitors the expected policy outcome will be a weighted average of the registrar's and legislature's ideal points. The weight on the legislature's ideal point is higher when the electoral environment is competitive than when it is not competitive. In contrast, it is not always the case that monitoring means that the expected policy outcome is closer to the legislature's ideal point. If the electoral environment is noncompetitive, then this is the case, the expected policy outcome is closer to the legislature's ideal point. But if the electoral environment is competitive, then monitoring, since it costs the legislature resources, means that the expected policy outcome is actually closer to the registrar ideal point than if monitoring did not occur.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. First we consider the case where there is a noncompetitive electoral environment.
If the legislator does not monitor, he receives for sure:
legislator does monitor, he expects to receive:
The certainty equilivalent of E[U L ] is the utility for which the legislature is indi¤erent between the gamble F (") and the certainty amount cert(F; "): The certain amount cert(F; ") that makes the legislature indi¤erent between monitoring and not monitoring is such that:
Solving for cert(F; e) : cert(F; ") = b
In the competitive electoral environment, need to …ll this in.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. The registrars'optimal choices if there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive is given by: U We can now solve for the equilibrium policy substituting into equation (3) which yields:
The case where the electoral environment is competitive but there is no monitoring, is solved similarly with c = 0: We can summarize the predictions in Table A2 : 
where 0 < 2 < 1 ; 0 < 1
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. The proof of proposition 4 is straightforward by following the same procedures as in proposition 2 substituting in from the results of proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. In the case where the two registrars who care about both state and local policy, the utility functions for the two registrars and there is no monitoring and the electoral environment is noncompetitive are given by:
( (1 ) These solutions then give the conclusions drawn in the Proposition.
